Below is a Martenson Report from February that I am now making freely available. I referenced it in today’s Financial Sense Newshour broadcast with Jim Puplava.
This report states my arguments for why our experiences with steadily rising asset prices, mainly for stocks and bonds and houses, over the 1980’s and 1990’s may have been as much a function of simple demographic pressures as anything else.
It’s worth pondering.
Where are we going, and what lies next? To address these questions, we need to know how we got here in the first place.
I want to share with you an interesting observation that I think will provide great clarity and insight into our current predicament, as well as indicate that our recovery, such as it is, will be protracted and incomplete.
The Great Baby Boomer Asset Bubble
by Chris MartensonBelow is a Martenson Report from February that I am now making freely available. I referenced it in today’s Financial Sense Newshour broadcast with Jim Puplava.
This report states my arguments for why our experiences with steadily rising asset prices, mainly for stocks and bonds and houses, over the 1980’s and 1990’s may have been as much a function of simple demographic pressures as anything else.
It’s worth pondering.
Where are we going, and what lies next? To address these questions, we need to know how we got here in the first place.
I want to share with you an interesting observation that I think will provide great clarity and insight into our current predicament, as well as indicate that our recovery, such as it is, will be protracted and incomplete.
As cynical as I am, I just can’t keep up.
That sentence is a paraphrase of a quote by Lily Tomlin that reads, “No matter how cynical you become, it’s never enough to keep up.”
I have long been a cynic of the bailouts, and, unfortunately, I cannot detect even the slightest sliver of daylight between the prior and current administrations. The reason, I fear, is captured by this quote from Simon Johnson, the former Chief Economist at the IMF and current professor at MIT’s Sloan School of Management:
The crash has laid bare many unpleasant truths about the United States. One of the most alarming, says a former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, is that the finance industry has effectively captured our government—a state of affairs that more typically describes emerging markets, and is at the center of many emerging-market crises. If the IMF’s staff could speak freely about the U.S., it would tell us what it tells all countries in this situation: recovery will fail unless we break the financial oligarchy that is blocking essential reform. And if we are to prevent a true depression, we’re running out of time.
The unfortunate conclusion here is that our system and processes are fully “captured” by a tangled web of interests that serve themselves over everything else. Your future, my future, and our future is being systematically ruined by a self-interested group of insiders that can no longer distinguish between their good and the common good.
Here’s the latest string of outrages from this week.
America is Being Looted
by Chris MartensonAs cynical as I am, I just can’t keep up.
That sentence is a paraphrase of a quote by Lily Tomlin that reads, “No matter how cynical you become, it’s never enough to keep up.”
I have long been a cynic of the bailouts, and, unfortunately, I cannot detect even the slightest sliver of daylight between the prior and current administrations. The reason, I fear, is captured by this quote from Simon Johnson, the former Chief Economist at the IMF and current professor at MIT’s Sloan School of Management:
The crash has laid bare many unpleasant truths about the United States. One of the most alarming, says a former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, is that the finance industry has effectively captured our government—a state of affairs that more typically describes emerging markets, and is at the center of many emerging-market crises. If the IMF’s staff could speak freely about the U.S., it would tell us what it tells all countries in this situation: recovery will fail unless we break the financial oligarchy that is blocking essential reform. And if we are to prevent a true depression, we’re running out of time.
The unfortunate conclusion here is that our system and processes are fully “captured” by a tangled web of interests that serve themselves over everything else. Your future, my future, and our future is being systematically ruined by a self-interested group of insiders that can no longer distinguish between their good and the common good.
Here’s the latest string of outrages from this week.
In this Martenson Report for subscribers, I continue with Part II of our discussion on what the next oil supply crunch will mean and steps you might take today to lessen the impact.
Oil – The Coming Supply Crunch (Part II)
Here’s a snippet:
Executive Summary
- Explaining Oil Pricing – oil prices are "set at the margin"
- Oil Storage – When it’s pumped out of the ground it has to go somewhere
- Oil Price Behavior – slight supply and demand imbalances drive prices
- The Total Shortfall – too little oil to support a robust recovery
- Nothing Fails Like Success – the worst thing would be a rapid economic recovery
- Timing – when will Oil Shock III arrive?
- What should you do?
- Investments, food, selecting a community, and an abbreviated buy list
In Part I of this report, I laid out the case that the
combination of declines in the production output of existing oilfields and a
lack of investment in new oil fields would lay the foundation for Oil Shock
III.
This report will examine Oil Shock III by painting a number
of possible scenarios, and then discuss steps you might take to weather the
storm, when it arrives. I will help you
translate current news and future projections into actionable information. My goal is to help you better understand what
is going on and what you can personally do about it.
New Martenson Report: Oil – The Coming Supply Crunch (Part II)
by Chris MartensonIn this Martenson Report for subscribers, I continue with Part II of our discussion on what the next oil supply crunch will mean and steps you might take today to lessen the impact.
Oil – The Coming Supply Crunch (Part II)
Here’s a snippet:
Executive Summary
- Explaining Oil Pricing – oil prices are "set at the margin"
- Oil Storage – When it’s pumped out of the ground it has to go somewhere
- Oil Price Behavior – slight supply and demand imbalances drive prices
- The Total Shortfall – too little oil to support a robust recovery
- Nothing Fails Like Success – the worst thing would be a rapid economic recovery
- Timing – when will Oil Shock III arrive?
- What should you do?
- Investments, food, selecting a community, and an abbreviated buy list
In Part I of this report, I laid out the case that the
combination of declines in the production output of existing oilfields and a
lack of investment in new oil fields would lay the foundation for Oil Shock
III.
This report will examine Oil Shock III by painting a number
of possible scenarios, and then discuss steps you might take to weather the
storm, when it arrives. I will help you
translate current news and future projections into actionable information. My goal is to help you better understand what
is going on and what you can personally do about it.
Sunday, April 12, 2009
Executive Summary
- Explaining Oil Pricing – oil prices are "set at the margin"
- Oil Storage – When it’s pumped out of the ground it has to go somewhere
- Oil Price Behavior – slight supply and demand imbalances drive prices
- The Total Shortfall – too little oil to support a robust recovery
- Nothing Fails Like Success – the worst thing would be a rapid economic recovery
- Timing – when will Oil Shock III arrive?
- What should you do?
- Investments, food, selecting a community, and an abbreviated buy list
These prices now are dangerously low. The lower prices fall, the less oil will be produced and the greater the chance of an oil spike.
We are three, six, maybe nine months away from a price shock. We are not talking about three to five years away — it will be much sooner.
Within a few months, we are going to realize our visible inventories are really tight — squeaky tight — and what would really be inconvenient is to see a recovery in the economy."
Matt Simmons, Chairman of energy investment-banking firm Simmons & Co, March 26, 2009
Oil – The Coming Supply Crunch (Part II)
PREVIEW by Chris MartensonSunday, April 12, 2009
Executive Summary
- Explaining Oil Pricing – oil prices are "set at the margin"
- Oil Storage – When it’s pumped out of the ground it has to go somewhere
- Oil Price Behavior – slight supply and demand imbalances drive prices
- The Total Shortfall – too little oil to support a robust recovery
- Nothing Fails Like Success – the worst thing would be a rapid economic recovery
- Timing – when will Oil Shock III arrive?
- What should you do?
- Investments, food, selecting a community, and an abbreviated buy list
These prices now are dangerously low. The lower prices fall, the less oil will be produced and the greater the chance of an oil spike.
We are three, six, maybe nine months away from a price shock. We are not talking about three to five years away — it will be much sooner.
Within a few months, we are going to realize our visible inventories are really tight — squeaky tight — and what would really be inconvenient is to see a recovery in the economy."
Matt Simmons, Chairman of energy investment-banking firm Simmons & Co, March 26, 2009
A new Martenson Report is ready for subscribers.
Link: Oil – The Coming Supply Crunch (Part I)
A snippet from the opening:
This is one of the most important Martenson Reports I will write this
year. In this report, I explain
why the global stimulus plan will not succeed at returning the global economy
to a path of sustainable growth or even to its former heights, seen in
2006/2007.
A snippet from the conclusion:
The assumption by the G20 that money printed out of thin air is both necessary and sufficient to return us to a renewed path of global economic growth is deeply flawed. Trillions of dollars in new stimulus money will soon “find their mark” and stampede off looking for something to do. The energy to support all this money does not exist, at least if the independent efforts of three diverse institutions that have studied the data are to be trusted (and I do because their conclusions are so similar).
The combination of rapid declines in existing fields and a collapse in oil field investment means that it is extremely unlikely that we’ll have enough oil to return the globe to robust growth.
While it is possible that we’ll close some of the energy gap with efficiency measures, a decade or more of lead-time sits between the development of more efficient technologies and their full market penetration, which means that efficiency is unlikely to play anything other than a bit part in this developing drama.
Any plan to stimulate growth that does not take this energy reality into account is highly suspect and is probably flawed. Why this most obvious of all connections is not being openly discussed will be for future historians to dissect. For now, it is up to each of us to define for ourselves how much importance we place in this line of thinking.
Martenson Report Ready – Oil Shock III
by Chris MartensonA new Martenson Report is ready for subscribers.
Link: Oil – The Coming Supply Crunch (Part I)
A snippet from the opening:
This is one of the most important Martenson Reports I will write this
year. In this report, I explain
why the global stimulus plan will not succeed at returning the global economy
to a path of sustainable growth or even to its former heights, seen in
2006/2007.
A snippet from the conclusion:
The assumption by the G20 that money printed out of thin air is both necessary and sufficient to return us to a renewed path of global economic growth is deeply flawed. Trillions of dollars in new stimulus money will soon “find their mark” and stampede off looking for something to do. The energy to support all this money does not exist, at least if the independent efforts of three diverse institutions that have studied the data are to be trusted (and I do because their conclusions are so similar).
The combination of rapid declines in existing fields and a collapse in oil field investment means that it is extremely unlikely that we’ll have enough oil to return the globe to robust growth.
While it is possible that we’ll close some of the energy gap with efficiency measures, a decade or more of lead-time sits between the development of more efficient technologies and their full market penetration, which means that efficiency is unlikely to play anything other than a bit part in this developing drama.
Any plan to stimulate growth that does not take this energy reality into account is highly suspect and is probably flawed. Why this most obvious of all connections is not being openly discussed will be for future historians to dissect. For now, it is up to each of us to define for ourselves how much importance we place in this line of thinking.